California Western School of Law

CWSL Scholarly Commons
Faculty Scholarship
2010

"And I Don't Know Why it is That You Threw Your Life Away":
Abolishing Life Without Parole, The Supreme Court in Graham v.
Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for a Second
Chance
Leslie Culver
California Western School of Law, lculver@cwsl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/fs
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Culver, Leslie, ""And I Don't Know Why it is That You Threw Your Life Away": Abolishing Life Without Parole,
The Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for a Second
Chance" (2010). Faculty Scholarship. 136.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/fs/136

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu.

Culver, Leslie 1/15/2015
For Educational Use Only

“AND I DON'T KNOW WHY IT IS THAT YOU THREW..., 20 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 35

20 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 35
Boston University Public Interest Law Journal
Fall 2010
Articles
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Abstract
Terrance Graham pled guilty to armed burglary with assault or battery and attempted armed robbery when he was sixteen years
old. He was sentenced to prison for the rest of his life. Like Roe v. Wade made history by forcing this country to consider the
morality of abortion, so too will the United States Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Florida make history by challenging
the morality of sentencing juveniles for the rest of their lives. After firmly abolishing the death penalty for all juvenile offenders
under the age of eighteen, as a violation of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Court has once
again curbed the punishments permissible for the juvenile offender. Reaffirming that juveniles are less culpable than adults,
the Court holds that life without parole is disproportionately harsh for juvenile non-homicide offenders, and is therefore cruel
and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.
*36 Standing in agreement with Graham, this Article analyzes two issues left in its wake: (1) the inconsistency in the Court's
reasoning when viewed against lengthy term of year sentences, and (2) the implicit requirement to reinstate effective parole
boards in light of Graham's new constitutional mandate to give juveniles a meaningful opportunity to reenter society. This
Article does not suggest that juvenile offenders escape punishment for committed offenses, but rather concludes that our country
acknowledges the historic impact and repercussions of Graham's central premise--juveniles are different from adults. Because
of this decision, states must deal with those differences in tangible ways to give juvenile offenders hope to reenter society.
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I. Introduction
Well, if we--if we have already said that you can't impose death on an adult who hasn't committed a homicide, an intentional
death, and so for an adult the most serious sentence that we can give them is life without parole, why should that same sentence
be given to a juvenile who we have recognized as being less capable than an adult? And why should we permit *37 it for a
crime that's not comparable to a homicide and/or something akin in seriousness to that? 1
... .
[H]ow do you answer the argument that unlike an adult, because of the immaturity, you can't really judge a person--judge a
teenager at the point of sentencing? That it's only after a period of time has gone by, and you see: [h]as this person overcome
those youthful disabilities? That's why a proportionality review on the spot doesn't accommodate the--what is the driving force
of the - your--the Petitioner's argument is you can't make a judgment until years later to see how that person has--has done. 2

In a collision between the sentencing practices for juvenile offenders and the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, the juvenile offender once again prevails. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Graham v.
Florida and its precedent centered on a seeming friction between the constitutional origin of “cruel and unusual punishment”
for juveniles in light of the Eighth Amendment and the evolving standards of decency in our society. 3 This friction has
divided the United States from other countries in its treatment of juvenile offenders, in that all countries--except the United
States and Somalia--explicitly forbid life imprisonment without the possibility of release for juvenile offenders. 4 The Eighth
Amendment provides that *38 “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted,” 5 and is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 “[T]he Eighth Amendment
guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions. The right flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”’ 7 Further, in determining which punishments
are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual, it is necessary to refer to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.” 8 “This is because ‘[t]he standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily
embodies a moral judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society
change.”’ 9
The Graham Court stated that life without parole, the second most severe criminal punishment--second only to the death
penalty 10 --violates two features of the Eighth Amendment: first, the concept of “proportionality” (balancing the punishment
with the culpability, or guilt, of the offender), and second, the “essential principle” of the Eighth Amendment, which is the
state's duty to “respect the human attributes even of those who have committed serious crimes.” 11 Based on these principles,
the Graham Court produced a landmark categorical rule rejecting a case-by-case analysis and holding that life without parole
for juvenile non-homicide offenders (juveniles who do not murder) violates the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. 12 A life without parole sentence for juvenile offenders means there is no possibility of release from
incarceration during the offender's lifetime. 13
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The scope of this Article is limited by Terrance Graham's “adult” designation. 14 Briefly, Terrance Graham was tried as an
adult for his crimes, and if a *39 juvenile offender is charged as an adult, they are transferred to adult court and thereafter
susceptible to life without parole. 15 As such, this Article will not discuss Graham's implication, if any, on juvenile transfers.
Rather, this Article analyzes the current state and future fate of sentencing practices for juvenile offenders in light of the Graham
decision. Part I will provide a historical overview of life sentences for juveniles, both with and without parole. Part II will
review the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence surrounding juvenile sentencing and permissible punishments from
1988 to 2010. Finally, Part III will critically evaluate two issues stemming from Graham: (1) the inconsistency in the Court's
reasoning when viewed against allowing lengthy term of year sentences, and (2) the implicit requirement to reinstate effective
parole boards in light of Graham's new constitutional mandate to give juveniles a meaningful opportunity to reenter society.
In its conclusion, this Article does not suggest that juvenile offenders escape punishment for committed offenses, but rather,
that our country acknowledge the historic impact and repercussions of Graham's central holding--juveniles are different from
adults. 16 Because of this decision, states must deal with the inherent differences between adults and juveniles in tangible ways
in order to give juvenile offenders hope to reenter society.

II. The Rise of Life Without Parole For Juveniles: A Historical Look at a Sentence Ignited by Fear
Gary C. “falsely confessed to a murder that occurred when he was fourteen years old.” 17 Having waived his constitutional
rights, he was interrogated by police; first in the company of his mother and then without her being present, during which time
he told police what they “wanted to hear.” 18 “No one double checked his statements.” 19 Presumably, Gary did not know
someone should: “[H]e did not know what would happen once he confessed, but he had no idea he could be sentenced to life
without parole.” 20
Sentencing practices for juvenile offenders have changed considerably throughout history. In the eighteenth century, juvenile
offenders were charged *40 and tried in adult criminal court. 21 By the nineteenth century, many child welfare advocates
reformed the country's view of children, and states found it counter-productive to convict children along with adults. 22 In
response to this view, individual states--beginning with Illinois in 1899--established a separate justice system for children, each
with its myriad of laws, policies, and practices. 23
Over the last three decades, the United States has been inundated with “tough on crime” policies, which along with a decrease
in rehabilitation, has made the United States the country with the highest incarceration rates for adults and juveniles. 24 These
tough policies were due in part to the fear of the juvenile offender, which rose significantly in the mid-1980s. 25 Arguably the
United States was feeling the stress of the twelve, thirteen, and fourteen-year-olds who were trading in make-up kits, football
jerseys, and video games, in exchange for knives, guns, and other weapons of choice. No longer were the boy and girl next door
the neighborhood “role models,” but rather they became the kids neither you nor your children made eye contact with.
One of the most infamous theories which seemed to single-handedly ignite the growing nationwide panic was John DiIulio's
1995 “warning that ‘ . . . on the horizon . . . are tens of thousands of severely morally impoverished juvenile superpredators.”’ 26
Because of the already existing increase in juvenile *41 violent crime, this super-predator myth spread like wildfire. 27
Describing the juvenile super-predator, DiIulio writes:
First, they are radically present-oriented. Not only do they perceive no relationship between doing right
(or wrong) now and being rewarded (or punished) for it later. They live entirely in and for the present
moment; they quite literally have no concept of the future . . . . . Second, the super-predators are radically
self-regarding. They regret getting caught . . . . . And they place zero value on the lives of their victims,
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whom they reflexively dehumanize as just so much worthless “white trash” if white, or by the Fo [sic] usual
racial or ethnic epithets if black or Latino. 28

Remarkably, this super-predator myth arrived on the scene during a decrease in juvenile crime. 29 Nonetheless, this myth along
with other catchy phrases like “adult time for adult crime,” 30 caused the United States to abandon “its commitment to a juvenile
justice system and the youth rehabilitation principles embedded in it.” 31
*42 With the increase of “tough on crime” policies, life sentences (with and without parole) also increased. 32 Despite various
alternatives to incarceration, state policies expanded the types of offenses that resulted in life sentences and the restriction of
parole, ultimately increasing the length of prison terms. 33 Furthermore, other legislative and public perceptions contributed
to the rise in life sentences:
In particular, support for the expansion of [life without parole] sentences grew out of the same mistrust
of the judicial process that birthed sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimums, and ‘truth-in-sentencing’
laws to restrict parole eligibility. These policies have often been politically inspired and fueled by accounts
of people sentenced to life, often for violent crimes, being released on parole within a decade. Public
dissatisfaction was part of a larger movement toward more legislative control of the criminal justice
process at the expense of the discretion of judges and parole boards. The expansion of [life without parole]
sentencing was intended to ensure that ‘life means life.’ 34

Currently, every State permits some type of life sentence, either with or without parole, for juveniles. 35 Yet before 1980,
juveniles rarely received a life without parole sentence. 36
For example, this chart 37 illustrates that between 1962 until 1981, an average of two youth offenders each year entered prison
with life without parole sentences in the United States. 38

Number of Youth Offenders Admitted to Prison with Life without Parole over Time
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
*43 The number rose beginning in 1982, peaking at 152 juveniles in 1996. 39 While the numbers have declined since 1996,
they have not returned to the much lower figures from the 1960s to mid-1980s. 40 Reportedly, juveniles are now sentenced to
life without parole three times as frequently as they were in 1990. 41 Between 1985 and 2001, juveniles convicted of murder
received life without parole more than adults with the same convictions. 42 The real effect of a life without parole sentence is
that it “condemns a child to die in prison.” 43
As of 2009, forty-six states have juveniles serving some type of life sentence; among these juveniles, 6,807 are serving life
sentences eligible for parole, while 1,755 (28.5%) are serving life without parole sentences. 44 Before the Court's 2010 Graham
opinion, life without parole was prohibited in Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico and Oregon. 45 Nationally, four states
account for half of the life without parole sentence population for juveniles: Pennsylvania (345), California (239), Michigan
(152), and Louisiana (133). 46 “In many of these cases, judges were not permitted to consider sentences other than [life without
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parole] because of legislatively mandated restrictions concerning certain crimes. Therefore, mitigating circumstances--which
almost universally accompany these cases . . .--are not allowed to be considered.” 47
Juveniles are not inherently among the worst offenders to warrant life without parole sentences. In 2005, the first national
study of juvenile life without parole sentences, prepared by Human Rights Watch, 48 challenged the general presumption that
life without parole was reserved for the most violent youth, the “worst of the worst,” and the assumption that only chronic
repeat offenders *44 served life without parole sentences. 49 This study found that first-time offender youths served fifty-nine
percent of the sentences nationwide. 50 Sixteen percent of the offenders were between the ages of thirteen and fifteen at the
time they committed their crimes. 51 “In addition, in 26% of cases, the juvenile serving an LWOP sentence was not the primary
assailant and, in many cases, was present but only minimally involved in the crime. However, because of state law, they were
automatically given a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.” 52
For example, where the juvenile was merely present during the commission of a homicide, the “felony murder” rule sealed his
or her fate. 53 This rule is invoked if someone is killed during the commission of a felony, resulting in excessive punishment for
the juvenile who is present. 54 Described as “the pinnacle of inconsistency between an actor's culpability and his subsequent
punishment,” the felony murder rule subjects a juvenile to a life sentence without having committed the requisite homicide. 55
Whether juveniles receive life or life without parole sentences is affected by at least four factors reflective of both practice and
policy: prosecutorial discretion, judicial waivers, media representations, and the politicized nature of parole decisions. 56 In
addition to all of these factors, a murder conviction is usually the strongest basis for receiving a life sentence with or without
parole. 57
First, prosecutorial discretion influences the selection of the charged offense and whether the defendant is charged as a juvenile
or an adult. 58 “Once transferred to the adult court, young people face the same sentencing options as adults, including the
possibility of sentences to life or life without parole.” 59
Second, closely tied to prosecutorial discretion are judicial waivers--either discretionary or mandatory--where the court makes a
determination to transfer a juvenile to adult court. 60 Judicial waivers, the most common transfer method, drastically increased
between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. 61 This was due, in *45 part, to some state legislatures drafting statutes to exclude
persons of a certain age who were charged with certain crimes from being defined as a “juvenile.” 62 In such a scenario, at
least theoretically, the district attorney is left with no option but to file charges in adult criminal court. 63 Similarly, in some
cases, depending upon the statutory sentencing requirements for the crime, the court is left with no discretion as to sentencing
options. 64 By the mid-1990s, most states adopted punitive laws to transfer more children to adult court, in order to punish them
more severely. 65 However, trying children as adults in adult court so they receive “adult” punishments,
[S]quarely contradicts that most basic premise behind the establishment of juvenile justice systems: ensuring the well-being
of youth offenders. The harsh sentences dispensed in adult courts do not take into account the lessened culpability of juvenile
offenders, their ineptness at navigating the criminal justice system, or their potential for rehabilitation and reintegration into
society. 66

The 2005 Human Rights Watch study also reports findings concerning the procedures involved in trying children as adults:
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When children are tried in criminal courts, little or no accommodation is made to take into account their youth. Whether eleven
or seventeen, the *46 child offender must participate in all the same pre-trial and trial procedures and confront all the same
decisions that adult defendants do. Contrary to popular belief, it is the child and not his or her parent or guardian who must
decide what to tell the police and defense attorneys, whether or not to follow attorney instructions, whether to testify, whether
to give information to the prosecution, and whether to go to trial or accept a plea bargain. 67
....
The trial of children as adults often fails to provide children with the special safeguards and care to which they are entitled
under international law. Juvenile justice advocates in the United States widely recognize that decisions to send youth to adult
court are often arbitrary and unfair and pay scant attention to the goal of rehabilitation. Once in the adult system, adolescents
are deprived of the wide variety of rehabilitative sentencing options that they might be eligible to receive in the juvenile court
system-sentencing options that are designed to give them the tools they need to turn their lives around and become law-abiding
members of society. 68

Third, in addition to prosecutorial and judicial discretion, media reports, slogans such as “adult crime, adult time,” and illinformed warnings by policy-makers also encouraged the fear that violent juvenile crime was on the rise. 69 States implemented
policies to crack down on crime, and as a result sent thousands of youths into the juvenile justice system. 70
Lastly, releasing offenders eligible for parole has become a highly politicized issue, especially where current and prospective
office holders demonstrate their tough stance on crime by limiting the number of offenders released on parole. 71 For example,
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger sought to change the parole policies of his predecessor Gray Davis (who released
only eight people on parole between 1999 and 2003), and in 2004 permitted seventy-two releases. 72 After receiving harsh
criticism, Governor Schwarzenegger approved only thirty-five parole recommendations in 2005 and just twenty-three in
2006. 73
Unfortunately, borne out of fear and political agendas, life sentences (with and without parole) rose in America, to the detriment
of many juvenile offenders. Yet, in Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court drew another line in juvenile offender
sentencing to bring national uniformity to a discretionary juvenile justice system. But, this may be a hollow victory; while this
superficial *47 line closes the door on one sentence, life without parole, it implicitly encourages the use of another harsh
sentence--lengthy term of years. Further, while the holding in Graham underscores that juveniles need an opportunity to reenter
society, it does so without explicitly requiring that all states reinstate parole.

III. From 1988 to 2010: A Review of Supreme Court Jurisprudence in Juvenile Sentencing
Graham v. Florida marks a pivotal step in what appears to be a moral retreat from harsh penalties for juvenile offenders.
Beginning with Thompson v. Oklahoma in 1988, the Court held that the death penalty was unconstitutional for offenders
who were younger than sixteen at the time of their offense. 74 There, fifteen-year old William Wayne Thompson, along with
three older persons, participated in the brutal murder of Thompson's former brother-in-law. 75 Although Thompson was a
“child” under Oklahoma law, the trial court concluded that “there [were] virtually no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation of
Thompson within the juvenile system and that Thompson should be held accountable for his acts as if he were an adult and
should be certified to stand trial as an adult.” 76 During the penalty phase of his trial, the jury found the murder especially
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heinous and sentenced Thompson to death. 77 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a death sentence for
a crime committed by a fifteen-year-old child was cruel and unusual punishment. 78
On review, the Thompson Court drew a distinguishing line between childhood and adulthood. Consistent with “the experience
of mankind, as well as the long history of our law,” the Thompson Court found “that the normal 15-year-old is not prepared to
assume the full responsibilities of an adult.” 79 Confining its attention to the eighteen states which had a minimum age for the
death penalty, the Court found that those states required defendants to be at least sixteen years old at the time of their offense
before they could be subject to capital punishment. 80 The petitioner asked the Court to draw a categorical line prohibiting
the execution of any person under the age of eighteen. 81 However, because Thompson was only fifteen at the time of his
offense, the Court *48 ultimately abolished the death penalty for juveniles, who at the time of their offense were younger
than sixteen. 82
A year after Thompson, the Court concluded in Stanford v. Kentucky, 83 that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments did
not forbid the execution of sixteen and seventeen-year-old juvenile offenders. 84 There, Kevin Stanford, who was seventeen
at the time of the offense, brutally murdered a twenty-year-old woman after repeatedly raping and sodomizing her. 85 The
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Stanford's convictions for murder, first-degree sodomy, first-degree robbery, and receiving
stolen property, and upheld the sentence of death and forty-five years in prison. 86 Looking only at objective indicia, the United
States Supreme Court found no national consensus forbidding capital punishment for “any person who murders at 16 or 17
years of age,” and therefore capital punishment in these cases did not offend the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. 87
However, almost twenty years later in the 2005 case of Roper v. Simmons, the Court revisited and overruled its decision in
Stanford. 88 By then, the proposal in Thompson to draw the line at eighteen was ripe before the Court. Affirmatively relying
on the exercise of its independent judgment as to whether the death penalty was a disproportionate punishment for juveniles,
the Court extended the abolishment of the death penalty to juveniles who were younger than eighteen when they committed
offenses. 89 There, Christopher Simmons was seventeen years old when he coerced two other youths to commit burglary and
murder, a plan he conjured up bragging to his friends that they could get away with the murder because they were minors. 90
Tried as an adult in Missouri for burglary, kidnapping, stealing, and murder in the first degree, the trial court agreed with the
jury's recommendation for the death penalty. 91 However, on appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner as
to the infrequency of the death penalty for juveniles under eighteen, set aside the trial court's decision, and instead imposed life
without the possibility of parole, *49 which the United States Supreme Court affirmed. 92
In Thompson and Roper, the Court firmly abolished the death penalty for all juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen as a
violation of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 93 Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Court
once again curbed the punishments permissible for juvenile offenders. 94 Acquiescing to its prior decisions which determined
that juveniles were different than adults, the Graham Court focused on the “human attributes” of juveniles, finding juveniles
“more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures” with characters that are “not as well formed.” 95
Even if the State of Florida was correct that Petitioner Graham might exhibit prison misbehavior or fail to mature, the Court
stated that the sentence was still deemed disproportionate because the judgment was made at the outset. 96 The Court believed
that the severity of “[a] life without parole sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and
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maturity.” 97 Finding this particular sentence cruel and unusual against the juvenile offender who did not commit homicide,
it reversed the judgment of the Florida District Court. 98

IV. Graham v. Florida: Abolishing Life Without Parole for the Juvenile Non-Homicide Offender
In July of 2003, then sixteen-year-old Terrance Graham and three other accomplices attempted to rob a restaurant in
Jacksonville, Florida. 99 Wearing masks, Graham and one of the accomplices entered through a door unlocked by a second
accomplice, after which the first accomplice struck the restaurant manager twice in the back of the head with a metal bar. 100
When the manager began yelling, Graham and the two accomplices ran out of the restaurant and *50 into a car driven by the
third accomplice. 101 Graham was arrested for attempted robbery and charged as an adult (in adult court) under Florida law
for: armed burglary with assault or battery, a first-degree felony carrying a maximum sentence of life without the possibility of
parole; and, attempted armed robbery, a second-degree felony carrying a maximum penalty of fifteen years imprisonment. 102
Graham pled guilty to both charges under a plea agreement, made a statement to the trial court of his intent to change his ways,
and served twelve months in a pre-trial detention facility. 103
Six months after being released, at the age of seventeen, Graham was arrested again, along with two other accomplices, for
forcibly entering into a home and holding the homeowner at gunpoint while the youths ransacked the home. 104 Later that same
evening, the three accomplices attempted a second robbery during which one of the accomplices was shot. 105 Graham drove
his two accomplices to a hospital, and after a lengthy car chase with police, he eventually crashed his car. 106 The police officers
apprehended Graham when he attempted to flee on foot. 107 Following the probation hearing, where he admitted violating
his probation, the trial court 108 held a sentence hearing where it ultimately imposed life without the possibility of parole, a
sentence far exceeding the request of Graham's attorney or the State's recommendation. 109 *51 Graham “was nineteen years
old at the time of his sentencing.” 110
In explaining its sentence, the trial court in Graham v. Florida stated:
Mr. Graham, as I look back on your case, yours is really candidly a sad situation. You had, as far as I can
tell, you have quite a family structure. You had a lot of people who wanted to try and help you get your
life turned around including the court system, and you had a judge who took the step to try and give you
direction through his probation order to give you a chance to get back onto track. And at the time you
seemed through your letters that that is exactly what you wanted to do. And I don't know why it is that you
threw your life away. I don't know why.

But you did, and that is what is so sad about this today is that you have actually been given a chance to get through this, the
original charge, which were very serious charges to begin with . . . . The attempted robbery with a weapon was a very serious
charge.
....
[I]n a very short period of time you were back before the Court on a violation of this probation, and then here you are two years
later standing before me, literally the--facing a life sentence as to--up to life as to count 1 and up to 15 years as to count 2.
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And I don't understand why you would be given such a great opportunity to do something with your life and why you would
throw it away. The only thing that I can rationalize is that you decided that this is how you were going to lead your life and that
there is nothing that we can do for you. And as the state pointed out, that this is an escalating pattern of criminal conduct on your
part and that we can't help you any further. We can't do anything to deter you. This is the way you are going to lead your life,
and I don't know why you are going to. You've made that decision. I have no idea. But, evidently, that is what you decided to do.
So then it becomes a focus, if I can't do anything to help you, if I can't do anything to get you back on the right path, then I have
to start focusing on the community and trying to protect the community from your actions. And, unfortunately, that is where
we are today is I don't see where I can do anything to help you any further. You've evidently decided this is the direction you're
going to take in life, and it's unfortunate that you made that choice.
I have reviewed the statute. I don't see where any further juvenile sanctions would be appropriate. I don't see where any youthful
offender sanctions would be appropriate. Given your escalating pattern of criminal conduct, it is apparent to the Court that you
have decided that this is the way you are going to live your life and that the only thing I can do now is to try *52 and protect
the community from your actions.” 111
Regarding this sentence, Justice Ginsburg stated during the November 9, 2009 oral arguments that “[t]he individual sentencing
judge might think that Graham is a very bad individual, but the prosecutor had a different judgment of it. And Florida doesn't
have any kind of proportionality review, doesn't have any review--appellate review of the sentences.” 112 Justice Ginsburg may
or may not be implying an abuse of power when she went on to state, “[t]his judge, I think, surprised everyone in the courtroom
with the--with the sentence. Certainly it was far beyond what the prosecutor recommended.” 113 At a minimum, one could read
her comment to infer she believed the sentencing judge acted with surprising harshness.
Graham filed a motion challenging the sentence under the Eighth Amendment, which was denied. 114 Florida's First District
Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling, finding that “Graham's sentence was not grossly disproportionate” to the crime and that
Graham was ultimately “incapable of rehabilitation.” 115 The Florida Supreme Court denied reviewing the case, 116 and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 117 ultimately reversing the judgment of the First District Court of Appeal of
Florida. 118
The Court's 2010 holding in Graham breathes modern life into the long-established Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause in favor of the juvenile offender. 119 Categorically abolishing life without parole sentences for juvenile
non-homicide offenders, the Graham Court based its decision largely on the lack of maturity, responsibility, and wisdom that
is characteristic of youth. 120 However, despite its lofty intentions, the Court's holding *53 left significant concerns in its
wake, including: (1) a line-drawing problem 121 as to when a lengthy term of years rises to the level of presumptive life without
parole, and (2) an implicit expectation that all states have active parole boards and rehabilitation measures in a country that
has historically seen a decrease in both.

A. Lengthy Term of Years is Presumptively the Same as Life Without Parole, andTherefore Should Be Abolished
The heart of the Court's holding turned on two points: the recognition of a juvenile's youthful immaturity as compared to adults,
and the Court's desire to allow juvenile offenders to reenter society. 122 For purposes of this Article, it will be assumed that
both reasons to abolish life without parole are sound; however, the essence of those reasons extends beyond abolishing life
without parole to abolishing lengthy term of year sentences, as well. By drawing the categorical line at banning life without
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parole sentences, and not extending Graham's reach to include any sentence that would deny a juvenile offender a meaningful
opportunity to reenter society, such as fifty years, the Court's holding inherently conflicts with its underlying reasoning in such
a way as to limit Graham's potential effectiveness.
1. Using a Categorical Rule, the Court Reaffirms Juveniles Are Different, Thus Not Deserving of Life Without Parole
The Graham Court confined its decision to juveniles below the age of eighteen at the time of the offense, because the age of
“18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood [.]” 123 The Court framed
the issue in Graham in two ways: first, “whether the Constitution permits a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison
without parole for a non-homicide crime” 124 and second, as “an issue the Court has not considered previously: a categorical
challenge to a term of years sentence.” 125 That the Court stated the issue in two distinct ways becomes important when viewed
in light of its holding, which will be discussed below. 126 Turning to its analysis, *54 at the outset, the Court had to determine
the type of review this sentencing challenge required: proportional or categorical? 127
In analyzing the constitutionality of sentences, the Court's cases have fallen “within two general classifications.” 128 The
first classification involves challenges to a lengthy term of years sentence in a particular defendant's case. 129 These types
of cases utilize a proportionality review where the Court determines whether that defendant's “sentence is unconstitutionally
excessive.” 130 The second classification involves cases in which the Court “use[s] categorical rules to define Eighth
Amendment standards,” which previously have related to restrictions on the use of the death penalty. 131 This category has
included cases regarding the nature of the offense and cases regarding the characteristics of the offender. 132 For example, the
Court has categorically held the death penalty impermissible for any non-homicide offenses 133 and has established categorical
*55 rules prohibiting the death penalty for defendants: (1) who committed their crimes before the age of 18, 134 or (2) whose
intellectual functioning is in a low range. 135 Further, in cases utilizing categorical rules, the Court looks first at the “objective
indicia of society's standards” as expressed in a state's legislative enactments and actual practice “to determine whether there is a
national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.” 136 Second, the Court is guided by its own independent judgment-in other words, an “understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose,” as
elaborated by its controlling precedent. 137
Ultimately, the Court analyzed Graham under its long-standing categorical review, previously reserved for death penalty
cases. 138 Because Graham concerned more than just Terrance Graham's particular sentence, the Court rejected the
proportionality review, and instead chose the categorical approach to analyze the constitutionality of a sentencing practice
applied to an entire class of offenders who committed a range of crimes. 139 Using this catch-all categorical rule, the Court
abolished life without parole based first upon its review of objective indicia and second upon the Court's own independent
judgment.
Reviewing first the objective indicia 140 --or the national consensus (statistics, research and other trends)--the Court found
that the majority of the country did not favor the use of life without parole for juvenile offenders despite having statutes in
place permitting its use. 141 The Court's research revealed that six jurisdictions did not permit life without parole sentences
for any juvenile offenders; seven permitted the sentence only for homicide crimes, and thirty-seven--including the District of
Columbia-- permitted the sentence for a juvenile non-homicide offender in some circumstances. 142 On this evidence, the State
of Florida argued that there was no national consensus against life without parole for non-homicide offenses committed by
juveniles. However, the Court found the argument “unavailing,” stating that an examination of “actual sentencing practices in
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[the states] where the sentence . . . is permitted . . . disclose[d] a consensus against its use.” 143 To support its point, the Court
relied *56 on a recent study 144 and its own independent research to find that only 129 juveniles nationwide were serving
life without parole sentences for non-homicide offenses, with 77 of the 129 in Florida and the remaining 52 only in 10 other
states. 145 Admitting that the statistics may not be precise, the Court nonetheless believed the available data was “sufficient
to demonstrate how rarely these sentences are imposed even if there are isolated cases that have not been included in the
presentations of the parties or the analysis of the Court.” 146
Yet, it was the Court's independent judgment, free from any objective data, that fueled its rationale to abolish life without parole
for juveniles. 147 On its own accord, the Court examined the differences between juveniles and adults, and the severity of life
without parole. 148 Guided by Roper, 149 the 2005 leading case affirmatively abolishing the death penalty for juveniles under
eighteen years old, the Court acknowledged that juveniles have lessened culpability than adults and are “less deserving of the
most severe punishments.” 150 Specifically, it noted that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and
outside pressures, and based on “these salient characteristics . . . ‘[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose
crime reflects irreparable corruption.”’ 151 Moreover, *57 “[a]s compared to adults, juveniles have a ‘lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility’; they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure’; and their characters are ‘not as well formed.”’ 152 Further,
Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably depraved
character’ than are the actions of adults. It remains true that ‘[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate
the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be
reformed.’ 153

Finally, “juveniles ‘lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions . . . .”’ 154 The Court also expressed a concern that sentencing judges are making permanent future
decisions on a juvenile's life foregoing any possibility that the juvenile may ever change; a determination that not even
expert psychologists can make. 155 “Accordingly, ‘juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst
offenders.”’ 156
Turning toward the sentence itself, the Court stated that life without parole for a juvenile, the second most severe punishment
next to the death penalty, is “especially harsh” a sentence for a juvenile. 157 Altering the offender's life, this sentence “deprives
the [offender] of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration[,]” 158 and for the juvenile offender this sentence
“means *58 denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever
the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.” 159
2. The Court's Holding Shuts One Door, But Leaves Open Another Detrimental Option--Lengthy Term of Years
There is an inherent conflict when comparing the Court's stated holding with the holding's underlying rationale, the latter of
which suggests that lengthy term of years sentences should also be abolished. As previously mentioned, the fact that the Court
stated the issue in two distinct ways is important in light of Graham's holding. Abolishing life without parole makes sense in
response to how the Court initially framed the issue; but, given how the Court framed the issue a second time, it arguably leaves
the door open to reasoning that the Court could have, or later will, abolish lengthy term of years sentences. 160
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The Court's holding centered on its independent judgment which utilized the pulse of society's morals for support. The results
of the Court's analysis concluded that juveniles are different from adults, and as such, juvenile offenders should have some hope
to reenter society. And while the majority of the Justices in Graham recognized the juvenile's diminished culpability in order to
abolish life without parole, the Court did not draw a categorical line in such a way as to prohibit any sentence denying a juvenile
offender a meaningful opportunity to reenter society. Whether the sentence is life without parole or a term of years, the common
thread is that a juvenile will be denied a “conceivable hope” of release, an idea central to the Court's holding. 161 This inherent
conflict begs the question of what the Court actually found unconstitutional: a sentencing practice in name only, or any sentence
which defeats the underlying goal of the Court's holding? If the effect of this categorical rule is to not “deprive[ ] [juveniles]
of the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human worth and potential,” then it follows that a
lengthy term of years sentence is also unconstitutional. 162
As an example of the conflict between the holding and its reasoning, consider two sixteen-year-olds, Andy Assault and Michael
Murder. Andy Assault commits an aggravated assault and Michael Murder commits an assault resulting in a homicide. If
Graham's reasoning means that life without parole is unconstitutional because juveniles are different, then neither Andy nor
Michael should receive life without parole. But under Graham's holding, Michael Murder, whose acts resulted in a homicide,
will be transferred to adult court and receive either life without parole or a lengthy term of years sentence, such as *59 sixty
years. 163 Michael's fate defeats the underlying goal of Graham--to give juvenile offenders some semblance of hope to reenter
society. And even with a sixty-year sentence, permanent decisions are still being made about a juvenile's life at the point of
sentencing. The Court raised this concern during oral arguments, when it commented that because of a juvenile's immaturity,
juveniles cannot really be judged as adults, and thus, an “on the spot” judgment was essentially inappropriate. 164
While beyond the scope of this Article, the very essence of Graham's reasoning should also preclude life without parole even
for juvenile murderers. Critics may argue that life without parole should remain on the table for juvenile homicide offenders
because of the gravity of the offense, but this is the inherent conflict Graham now presents. The Graham Court holds that life
without parole is disproportionate for the juvenile non-homicide offender, but it supports this reasoning by stating that juveniles
are less culpable than adults. The Court's reasoning does not distinguish between the non-homicide and homicide juvenile
offender; thus, the abolishment of life without parole should apply to both groups. Any concern by the states or crime victims
that a juvenile offender will not “pay” for their crime is lessened by the fact that the Graham Court has emphasized that a state
does not have to ever release a juvenile offender during their natural life:
It bears emphasis, however, that while the Eighth Amendment forbids a State from imposing a life
without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, it does not require the State to release that
offender during his natural life. Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be
irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of their lives. 165

Abolishing life without parole for juvenile offenders will allow courts to balance appropriate punishment for a juvenile offender
with the realization that juveniles are not adults.
Following Graham's holding, lengthy term of year sentences should also be abolished. The Court reasoned that a sentence of
life without parole “alters the *60 offender's life . . . . It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope
of restoration,” 166 and for the juvenile “means denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are
immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison
for the rest of his days.”' 167 By only abolishing life without parole for certain offenders and remaining silent on the effect of
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the ruling on other long-term sentences, Graham left open the detrimental option of a lengthy term of years sentence. 168 The
rationale for the Court's categorical abolishment of life without parole, however, also supports abolishing lengthy term of year
sentences, both with and without parole eligibility. Regarding a life without parole sentence, the Court acknowledged that “a
juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. A 16year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only.” 169 Nevertheless,
a sentence of forty, fifty, or sixty years received at age sixteen will still yield the same problem--a disproportionate amount
of time served.
Interestingly, Justice Alito's dissent pointed out that “petitioner [Graham] conceded at oral argument that a sentence of as much
as 40 years without the possibility of parole ‘probably’ would be constitutional.” 170 Justice Alito added, “[n]othing in the
Court's opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole.” 171 Petitioner Graham's
concession at oral argument was incorrect; forty years in prison for a juvenile is tantamount to life without parole. As mentioned,
a lengthy term of years sentence raises the same concerns which led the Court to abolish life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. It would be inherently inconsistent to strike down life without parole in the name of juvenile growth and
maturation, yet sustain a forty-year sentence, which implicitly suggests that a juvenile serving forty years is barred from growth
and maturation. On this point, it has been *61 noted that “[i]mposing such a punishment on a child contradicts our modern
understanding that children have enormous potential for growth and maturity as they move from youth to adulthood . . . .” 172
Further,
If the child's brain is still growing until either twenty or twenty-five . . . subjecting a child to adult punishment, especially life
without possibility of parole, is irrational. We do not know who that child will be in five years or ten years. Just as teenagers'
bodies change as they mature, so do their brains. 173

While any sentence imposed on a juvenile should certainly reflect the seriousness of the crime, the sentence cannot ignore
the diminished culpability of a juvenile as compared to an adult. 174 The Court asserted that not only are juveniles and adults
different, but that fundamental scientific distinctions make juveniles less culpable than adults. 175 Even Chief Justice Roberts in
his concurrence stated there was no reason that Terrance Graham should not be afforded the general presumption of diminished
culpability given to juveniles as established in Roper. 176 Further, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that Graham was a
juvenile whose culpability or blameworthiness was diminished by youth and immaturity. 177 Specifically, “Graham's youth
made him relatively more likely to engage in reckless and dangerous criminal activity than an adult; it also likely enhanced his
susceptibility to peer pressure.” 178 That Graham committed the crimes, as Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged, proves he was
dangerous and deserved punishment, but it did not establish that Graham was “particularly dangerous,” at least in comparison
to “the murderers and rapists for whom *62 the sentence of life without parole is typically reserved.” 179 “On the contrary,
[Graham's] lack of prior criminal convictions, his youth and immaturity, and the difficult circumstances of his upbringing noted
by the majority . . . all suggest that he was markedly less culpable than a typical adult who commits the same offenses.” 180
On this point, the dissent sharply criticized the majority's use of its independent judgment. Specifically, the dissent described
the majority's approach as unfettered power to approve or reject democratic choices in penal policy based not only on how
society's standards have evolved, but also “on the basis of the Court's ‘independent’ perception of how those standards should
evolve.” 181 Disagreeing with the majority's “‘moral’ conclusion that youth defeats culpability in every case,” the dissent
did not believe “the Constitution prohibit[s] judges and juries from ever concluding that an offender under the age of 18 has
demonstrated sufficient depravity and incorrigibility to warrant his permanent incarceration.” 182 The dissent asserted that the
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justice system, “stand[ing] between the defendant and an outraged public,” is better fit to recognize a rare juvenile offender
and the necessary punishment. 183
Despite the dissent's sharp criticism, the majority's categorical rule marginally protects the future of juvenile offenders with
the intent to give “all juvenile nonhomicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.” 184 Unfortunately, the
majority's holding simply does not go far enough to reach the holes it left open, thereby enabling a state to circumvent the
Court's holding by sentencing a juvenile non-homicide offender to a lengthy term of years, which will create “virtual lifers.” 185
Both life without parole and a lengthy term of years result in the same concern--an offender who has spent decades in prison
is likely to emerge a different person than when he was first sentenced as a juvenile. 186
Now, even in light of Graham, what will stop a prosecutor from seeking a fifty-year prison term for a fifteen-year-old juvenile
non-homicide offender? True, it is not “life without parole” by name, but it is not functionally any different. A juvenile sentenced
to fifty years at age fifteen will be in prison *63 until he is sixty-five years old. That juvenile's life is altered and he is deprived
of the most basic liberties without hope of restoration. In this generation, a fifteen-year-old believes age thirty is old. Therefore,
is it reasonable that this same fifteen-year-old would actually be motivated by the hope of eventual release, taking steps to
mature, because there exists a possibility he may see freedom again at age sixty-five? “For many of the children who are
sentenced to [life without parole], it is effectively a death sentence carried out by the state over a long period of time.” 187 This
problem completely circumvents the Court's holding and its entire rationale. This is more than a loophole; it is an open door.
Although a forty-year sentence may serve the penological goal of keeping a juvenile offender off the streets, at some point a
lengthy sentence will be challenged as denying juveniles the chance to demonstrate maturity and effectively be rehabilitated.
Do forty years forego effective rehabilitation? Fifty or sixty years most assuredly do. Juveniles who will spend the rest of their
childhood, and most of their adult life in prison will unlikely maintain the hope that fuels the desire to change, the primary
objective of rehabilitation. 188
In a Human Rights Watch Report, Ethan W., who began serving his prison term at age nineteen, “described hope as the only
thing preventing him from committing suicide.” 189 He explained that:
The only reason I don't kill myself is ‘cause there's still hope. I mean at least if you got a dog that you know is never going to
get adopted, that's never going to live free again, I mean they kill it. They put it to sleep. That's more humane than keeping him
in this cage the next twenty years, making him live with his own shit and his own piss. I came in here at seventeen years old
and what are they going to do, keep me for sixty or seventy years? I mean c'mon now . . . that's a long time! 190

If the country sees a rise in lengthy term of years sentences for juvenile offenders, the sentencing judge has an added burden in
light of Graham. A judge must not only determine what term of years will effectively punish the juvenile (to appease the state
and its citizens), but must also determine what term of years does not deprive a juvenile of a “meaningful opportunity” to obtain
release and reenter society (as the Graham holding now requires). 191 However, as Justice Thomas asks in his dissent, what
does a “meaningful opportunity” *64 mean? 192 What term of years will tread the line of that meaningful opportunity? What
term of years will cross over it? “The Court provides no answers to these questions, which will no doubt embroil the courts for
years.” 193 These inquiries mandate an understandable line, or at least a less than blurry one, in order to ensure uniformity and
consistency in juvenile sentencing practices consistent with Graham. Unfortunately, as a result of Graham, no such line exists.

B. Graham's Constitutional Mandate Will Require All States to Have ActiveParole Boards
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Sarah Kruzan was sixteen years old when she shot and killed her thirty-one-year-old pimp, and was thereafter sentenced to life
without parole, plus four years. 194 In 2009, Sarah reflected upon the gravity of her sentence, commenting that if she were ever
given a chance to speak to a parole board, she would say:
[F]irst of all, I've learned what moral scruples are; second, that every day is a challenge . . . that I've found
the ability to believe in myself, and that I have a lot of good to offer, now--the person who I am today,
at 29: 195 I believe that I could set a positive example. I'm very determined to show that no matter what
you've done, or where you've come from, or what you've experienced in life, it's up to you to change. 196

A year later Sarah filed an Application for Clemency with the Governor of California, wherein she stated:
If I am given the opportunity to rejoin society I know I will make the most of it. Just like I have made the
most and continued to make the most of my life here. I am requesting a commutation of my sentence based
on my history of abuse, my youthful age and vulnerability at the time of the crime *65 and because of
the person I am today. 197

There are likely many Sarah Kruzan's behind bars possibly for the rest of their lives. The inherent differences between juveniles
and adults, coupled with decreased recidivism rates, support the need for active state parole systems. During oral arguments
in Graham v. Florida, Chief Justice Roberts asked what evidence, if any, existed that a seventeen-year-old released on parole
would once again commit crimes. Petitioner Graham replied, “. . . I think that the evidence shows that, as people get older, they
are less likely to recommit crimes.” 198 Although knowledge of this decreased recidivism statistic may have contributed to the
Court's ultimate holding, it was the Court's recognition that juveniles are different from adults that controlled its mandate that
states must give juveniles a chance to reenter society.
1. The Court Hands Down a New Constitutional Mandate--States Are Now Required to Give “Some Meaningful Opportunity”
for Juvenile Offenders to Obtain Release
The familiar premise that juveniles are different than adults triggered Graham's charge to the states--give deserving juveniles
a chance to reenter society. During the Graham oral arguments, counsel for the State of Florida argued that a categorical rule
“goes against the national consensus and the national trend,” one such trend being the elimination of parole. 199 He added,
“[p]arole has been eliminated in many States. 15 States have totally eliminated it in the last 10, 15 years.” 200 Yet, despite
the State's argument against a categorical rule, the Court drew a “clear line” to protect juvenile non-homicide offenders who
lack the culpability to merit life without parole. 201 Of fundamental importance, the Court indicated that, while a state was
not required to guarantee eventual freedom, it must give offenders “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 202
The phrase “meaningful opportunity” originated during the Graham oral arguments when Justice Alito asked counsel for
Petitioner Graham at what point parole must be given. 203 Perhaps recognizing intuitively that to remove life without parole as a
constitutional option would force states to invoke parole boards, Justice Alito questioned whether a Colorado statute permitting
parole *66 eligibility after forty years would be constitutional. 204 In response, Petitioner stated that the individual state has
discretion in determining when parole should be permitted, but “even that long amount of time would give at least some hope
to the adolescent offender.” 205 When Chief Justice Roberts questioned the effectiveness of a state's parole system that granted
parole to, for example, “1 out of 20 applicants,” Petitioner argued:
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All that would have to be required is a meaningful opportunity to the adolescent offender to demonstrate
that he has in fact changed, reformed, and is now fit to live in society. It's--that's all. That's all we are asking
for. We are not asking that it be automatic right to get back out. 206

Unfortunately the Court did not define what a meaningful opportunity entailed, but simply instructed the states to “explore the
means and mechanisms for compliance.” 207 Still, while the Eighth Amendment prohibits a state from imposing a life without
parole sentence on a juvenile non-homicide offender, a state does not have to release an offender during his natural life. In
other words, an offender who commits a truly heinous crime “will remain behind bars for life.” 208 The effect of the Court's
holding on the sentencing problem is that it “forbid[s] States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never
will be fit to reenter society.” 209
At the heart of its opinion, the Court held that a categorical rule would give juvenile non-homicide offenders the opportunity
to demonstrate maturity and reform, as opposed to being “deprived of the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and
self-recognition of human worth and potential.” 210 Again relying on the Roper decision, the Graham Court reiterated that the
death penalty deprives juveniles of the opportunity to mature and find human worth, and applied those same concerns towards
imprisonment for life without parole. 211 The Court stated,
Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation
with society, no hope. Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and
rehabilitation. A young person who knows that he or she has no chance to leave prison before life's end has little incentive
to become a responsible individual. In some prisons, moreover, *67 the system itself becomes complicit in the lack of
development . . . . [I]t is the policy in some prisons to withhold counseling, education, and rehabilitation programs for those
who are ineligible for parole consideration. 212

The Court found Terrence Graham's fate to be inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment. 213 Specifically, his sentence
“guarantee[d] he [would] die in prison without any meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no matter what he might do to
demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not representative of his true character . . . .” 214 Spending the
“next half century attempting to atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes,” the State of Florida's sentence on Graham
“has denied him any chance to later demonstrate that he is fit to rejoin society based solely on a non-homicide crime that he
committed while he was a child in the eyes of the law. This the Eighth Amendment does not permit.” 215
2. Going Forward, the Court's Constitutional Mandate Implicitly Requires All States to Have Parole Boards and Likely
Rehabilitation Measures in Place
The Court in Graham makes it clear that the Eighth Amendment forbids states from imposing a life without parole sentence on a
juvenile non-homicide offender, but also that states do not have to actually release juvenile offenders during their natural life. 216
However, states must give juvenile non-homicide offenders a meaningful opportunity to obtain release and reenter society based
on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation before the juvenile spends the rest of his or her life in prison. 217 As previously
noted, Justice Thomas's dissent criticized the value of the newly founded “meaningful opportunity” requirement for juvenile
offenders, arguing that the Court's self-proclaimed narrow decision actually invites a “host of linedrawing problems . . . beyond
the strictures of the Constitution.” 218 Justice Thomas asked when the meaningful opportunity for release must occur, and “what
Eighth Amendment principles will govern review by the parole boards the Court now demands that States empanel?” 219 The
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line 220 the Court drew to abolish life without parole is important, but Graham still leaves lofty conditions in its wake, with
little practical guidance *68 as to how to execute them other than for the states to “explore the means and mechanisms for
compliance.” 221 What does seem relatively clear is that in order to carry out this new constitutional mandate, all states will
need an active parole board and rehabilitative measures in place. 222
As it stands, states have no duty to establish parole systems, and the federal government cannot require them to establish
systems. 223 At least fifteen states have abolished parole for all offenders, and at least four have abolished parole for certain
violent offenders. 224 Without mandatory parole systems, these states will likely be unable to provide any “meaningful
opportunity” for juvenile non-homicide offenders to obtain release and reenter society.
The reason for parole is sound in theory and worthwhile in practice. In theory, parole brings integrity to the justice system by
forcing the system to balance the repercussions of offenders' actions against the four penological justifications for incarceration:
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. *69 225 Further, parole is certainly worthwhile in practice because
it stops any one state from playing God over an offender's life. Whether one personally adheres to a religious or moral acumen,
the reasonable person would agree that while an educated guess about an offender's likelihood of recidivism can be grounded
in theory, psychology, and science, it is impossible to predict the prior offender's future with absolute certainty. Parole, or at
least eligibility for parole, is the manifestation of that latter truth. Parole acknowledges time served (which is in the interest
of society), but it also forces integrity in the justice system to ensure that the appropriate length of incarceration is not grossly
exceeded to the point of detriment and harm--a systemic accountability.
The need for systemic accountability in parole is demonstrated in the cases of Sandra Davis Lawrence (an adult) and Sarah
Kruzan (a juvenile). Sandra Davis Lawrence was sentenced to life imprisonment in California for the 1971 murder of her
lover's wife. 226 Having fled California, she returned to face trial in 1982 and was sentenced in 1983. 227 Ms. Lawrence
made substantial progress in maturation while incarcerated. 228 In 1993, Ms. Lawrence became eligible for parole, but despite
numerous recommendations from the Parole Board of Hearings, California Governors Wilson, Davis, and Schwarzenegger
repeatedly denied her parole. 229 Ms. Lawrence's case raised the question: at what point does a life sentence meet the four goals
for incarceration--retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation? 230 Ms. Lawrence was finally released on parole
in 2005; and, in 2008 the California Supreme Court, in a 4-3 ruling, upheld the trial court's decision that “the Governor must
consider more than the crime itself when making a parole suitability decision.” 231 After nearly twenty-four years in prison,
the California Supreme Court affirmed the “overwhelming” *70 evidence of her rehabilitation and her suitability for parole,
noting that once a prisoner has completed their base sentence, “the circumstances of the crime alone ‘rarely will provide a valid
basis for denying parole when there is strong evidence of rehabilitation and no other evidence of current dangerousness.”’ 232
Ms. Lawrence will remain free and on parole as a result of the 2008 decision. 233
Sadly, unlike Ms. Lawrence, Sarah Kruzan, sentenced at sixteen-years-old, may never be free. 234 Described as an overachiever
and Honor Roll student, young Sarah had a relatively normal and healthy life until she met “G.G.,” a thirty-one-year-old
“father figure,” who showered Sarah with lavish gifts and attention. 235 When Sarah turned thirteen, G.G. raped her, and
eventually put her out on the streets working as a prostitute for twelve-hour shifts. 236 “Three years later, fed up and frustrated,
Sarah snapped and killed G.G., and was subsequently sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Plus four
years.” 237 At age twenty-nine, reflecting upon the gravity of her sentence, Sarah cried, “[t]hat means I'm gonna die here . . .
I definitely know I deserve punishment: I mean, you don't just take somebody's life and think that it's okay; so yes, definitely,
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I deserve punishment.” 238 However, on further reflection Sarah asks and answers the question her sentencing judge should
have pondered more carefully: “How much? I don't know.” 239
In analyzing the balance between punishment and proportionality, a 2009 Sentencing Project report asked:
For what purpose are so many people incarcerated for life at an exponentially increasing cost? The
rationale for opposing the use of parole for persons serving a life sentence generally pivots around issues
of punishment, retribution, and incapacitation in the interest of public safety. This goal conjures up the
question of the appropriate duration of time in prison. How are these various goals met by a life sentence,
as opposed to a term of 15 or 25 years, for example? 240

This same report further suggests that parole hearings for juveniles offered at regularly scheduled intervals could provide the
appropriate venue to determine which individuals should remain incarcerated and which demonstrate the maturity *71 for
release. 241 The report also explains that:
Such a change would not necessarily mean that all parole eligible persons would be released at some point
during their term. In the interest of public safety, many individuals sentenced to life will serve the remainder
of their natural lives in prison. However, this reform would provide that a decision on release be made by a
professional parole board at the time of eligibility, taking into account a person's prospects for a successful
transition to the community. 242

Thus, to answer the Court's concern for juvenile reform, and building on the previous suggestion, states should build in
sentencing reviews. These reviews would provide a meaningful opportunity for release in a time frame that does not deprive
the juvenile of hope, a significant factor in the Graham Court's opinion. 243 Such reviews could be in ten, fifteen, or twentyyear increments, depending upon the nature of the crime and limited to those crimes with lengthy sentences. For example, in
Louisiana, the felony of producing or manufacturing cocaine or a cocaine base carries an imprisonment of ten to thirty years
of hard labor without parole or suspension, and up to a $500,000 fine. 244 However, if a juvenile is charged as an adult and
sentenced to a term of thirty years for a felony under a sentencing review system, the court could require the Louisiana Parole
Board to first review his eligibility for parole after ten years of imprisonment, and to offer rehabilitation programs while he
is incarcerated.
In April of 2010, Louisiana considered several pieces of legislation that could change the State's current parole system. 245
House Bill 195 would allow *72 inmates serving time for nonviolent crimes, such as drug possession, to be released with
a two-thirds majority vote of the parole panel if certain criteria are met, such as earning a GED and completing at least one
hundred hours of a pre-release program. 246 House Bill 194 would permit first-time offenders of violent crimes to accrue “good
time” credits for good behavior. 247 If approved, an offender could serve a minimum of 75% of their sentence, as opposed to
the previous 85%, before they may be eligible for parole. 248 Finally, House Bill 35 would grant automatic parole hearings to
inmates convicted of nonviolent crimes that are older than age sixty and have served at least ten years of their sentence. 249
While the language of some of the bills applies only to adult offenders, 250 the existence of the reform bills underscores the
point that states need functioning parole systems and that those systems should not be untenable. If such measures are in place
for the adult offender, then the juvenile offender should receive parole consideration even earlier in their lengthy sentence

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

18

Culver, Leslie 1/15/2015
For Educational Use Only

“AND I DON'T KNOW WHY IT IS THAT YOU THREW..., 20 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 35

in order to encourage good behavior and character improvement which leads to a meaningful opportunity to reenter society.
Graham now requires this earlier standard. 251
Critics may argue that a requisite review ten or twenty years into a thirty-year sentence undercuts the role of the prosecutor
in seeking a particular sentence, and subverts justice by altering the sentence imposed by the court. 252 *73 This concern
can be addressed in two ways. First, given the holding in Graham, a thirty-year sentence is now arguably tantamount to life
without parole and thus, too long a sentence to offer juveniles any hope of restoration. 253 Second, even if Graham does not
restrict the imposition of lengthy sentences, a review of the case after ten or twenty years does not mean that offender will be
paroled; a juvenile will continue to serve the entire thirty-year sentence if certain conditions are not satisfied to warrant parole
release. 254 Additionally, a *74 safeguard now exists for a juvenile offender when the court subjectively (as in Graham) or by
statute imposes a lengthy imprisonment. Graham's mandate that juvenile non-homicide offenders be given some meaningful
opportunity for release implicitly requires active parole boards to exist, and infers that the burden for providing such meaningful
opportunity falls on parole boards. 255
The Graham Court does not foreclose the possibility that a juvenile may spend his entire life or a significant part of it in
prison. 256 However, an incremental sentencing review by the parole board ensures that states adhere to Graham's mandate
for a meaningful opportunity for release. If the juvenile offender has not demonstrated change during imprisonment, then the
offender should *75 not be released on parole; but, such change cannot be assessed without a review. The Graham Court was
clear that “[b]y denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that
person's value and place in society. This judgment is not appropriate in light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender's capacity for
change and limited moral culpability.” 257
Once released there are measures that states can and should take to aid juvenile offenders' successful reentry into society. These
rehabilitation measures should align with the Court's concern of giving the juvenile offender hope, and encourage behavior and
character improvement. 258 Currently, many states have some form of an “aftercare” program where juvenile parole officers
supervise recently released juveniles. 259 At a minimum, aftercare programs generally require: communication between the
probation officer, the youth, and his or her parents/guardians; an assessment tool to measure progress; and, any other available
community resources deemed necessary. 260 In addition, many states participate in the Office of Justice Program's Serious
and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative, which was launched in October 2009 “to advance the safe and successful reentry of
individuals from prisons and jails into their communities.” 261
*76 These proposed rehabilitation measures could satisfy Justice Thomas's inquiry as to which “Eighth Amendment principles
will govern review by the parole boards the Court now demands that States empanel?” 262 According to the majority, life
without parole violated the Eighth Amendment's essential principle--that states “respect the human attributes even of those who
have committed serious crimes.” 263 Further, the majority noted that the standard for what is cruel under the Eighth Amendment
embodies a moral judgment; 264 which when applied to juveniles, requires states to take into account their youth, immaturity,
and lack of culpability. 265 By offering parole hearings at regularly scheduled intervals or sentencing reviews based on the
length of sentence, parole boards can put review mechanisms in place that reflect these Eighth Amendment principles. These
protections may prevent juveniles from being denied “any chance to later demonstrate that he is fit to rejoin society based solely
on a nonhomicide crime that he committed while he was a child in the eyes of the law.” 266 “This the Eighth Amendment
does not permit.” 267
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V. Conclusion
Following the Court's recent opinion in Graham v. Florida, this Article concludes two points. First, the Court's holding abolishing
life without parole leaves a detrimental door open for juvenile offenders to receive lengthy term of year sentences. 268 This is a
concern because a lengthy term of years sentence still carries the same problems raised by the Graham Court in abolishing life
without parole: a failure to recognize that juveniles are different than adults, and the need for juveniles to not be deprived of all
hope to ever renter society. Second, in light of Graham's new constitutional mandate to give juvenile offenders a “meaningful
opportunity” to obtain release, all states will need to establish active parole boards for juvenile offenders. Notably, “children
and adolescents are growing and maturing and the chances for them to ‘make it’ are *77 much higher than for adults.” 269
This Article does not suggest that juvenile offenders escape punishment for committed offenses, but rather, that our country
acknowledge the historic impact and repercussions of Graham's central premise--juveniles are different from adults. While
children may generally know right from wrong, by virtue of their immaturity, they have less than developed capacities to control
their impulses, to use reason to guide their behavior, and to think about the consequences of their conduct. 270 “They are, in
short, still ‘growing up,’ [and] [a] sentence of life without parole negates that reality, treating child offenders as though their
characters are already irrevocably set.” 271 Graham now requires states to account for the very real and tangible difference
between juveniles and adults. Thus, states can no longer impose life without parole on juvenile offenders to live out the rest of
their days in adult prison for crimes that may reflect unfortunate yet transient immaturity. 272
Knowing all too well the consequences of youthful immaturity, fourteen-year-old Stacy Torrance was sentenced to life without
parole in 1988 for felony murder, where during the course of a robbery, his accomplices murdered the victim without Stacy's
knowledge or assistance. 273 In a letter to Human Rights Watch, Stacy wrote:
Convinced that I could make some money, I agreed with my cousin to rob this guy of his keys so that [my
cousin] and his friend could rob the guy's and his father's apartment. . . . but I had no idea that this guy would
end up dead. . . . Yes, I made a mistake. I associated with the wrong crowd. I engaged in committing a crime
with them. However, is it fair that I spend the rest of my life in prison for a crime which was committed by
someone else without my knowledge or without me being present? I feel sorry for the life which was lost
in my case. I feel a deep sense of empathy for his family and what they must continue to endure in terms of
pain. But this tragedy was never supposed to happen. I don't absolve myself of all guilt. I, out of naiveness,
out of influence, out of the ignorance of knowing the consequences, agreed to do a crime: a robbery. 274

*78 Another juvenile offender wrote, “my life in prison has been like living in hell. It's like living and dying at the same time,
and with my sentence the misery never ends. Life in prison is no life at all. It is a mere existence.” 275 The Supreme Court's
decision in Graham v. Florida now takes its place in history. Reminding this country that juveniles are not the same as adults,
Graham in no way excuses the offenses committed by juveniles, but rather requires states to at least give them hope and a
meaningful opportunity for a second chance at life.

Footnotes
a1
Graham v. State, 982 So.2d 43, 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis added); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2019 (2010)
(emphasis added).
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Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2019-20 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).

112

Graham Transcript, supra note 1, at 32-33. The prosecutor recommended thirty years for the armed burglary charge. Graham, 130
S. Ct. at 2019.

113

Graham Transcript, supra note 1, at 33.

114

Since the trial court failed to rule on the motion within 60 days, it was deemed denied. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2020.
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115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Id.

118

Id. at 2034.

119

The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

120

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27.
As compared to adults, juveniles have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility”; they “are more vulnerable
or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure”; and their characters are “not as well formed.”
These salient characteristics mean that “[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender
whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”
Id. at 2026 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70, 573 (2005)).

121

Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion in Graham acknowledged the line-drawing problems that the Court's opinion left. Id. (Thomas,
J., dissenting).

122

See id. at 2026-27.

123

Id. at 2016 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 574). Because the Graham court drew the line at juveniles under the age of
eighteen at the time of their offense, this Article does not propose whether a juvenile who is seventeen and within months or days of his
eighteenth birthday should be treated as an adult falling outside the purview of Graham and the propositions set forth in this Article.

124

Id. at 2017-18.

125

Id. at 2022.

126

See infra note 160 and accompanying text.

127

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021-23.

128

Id. at 2021.

129

Id.

130

Id. For example, in Harmelin v. Michigan, the defendant was sentenced “to life without parole for possessing a large quantity of
cocaine.” Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961 (1991)). A closely divided Court upheld the sentence concluding that
the “Eighth Amendment contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle,’ that ‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and
sentence,’ but rather ‘forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”' Id. (quoting Harmelin, 501
U.S. at 997, 1000-01 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). The Harmelin Court set out the proportional
review analysis for determining whether a defendant's sentence for a term of years is grossly disproportionate to his crime under the
Eighth Amendment. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021. For this review, the Court compared the gravity
of the offense to the severity of the sentence. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021. “If this comparative analysis
‘validate[s] an initial judgment that [the] sentence is grossly disproportionate,’ the sentence is cruel and unusual.” Graham, 130 S.
Ct. at 2022 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005). And where this comparison leads to an inference of disproportionality, a Court
should then compare the defendant's sentence with sentences received by other offenders for the same crime, in other jurisdictions.
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005. Justice Roberts, concurring in Graham, referred to this review as intra jursidictional (where the Court
compares the defendant's sentence to sentences given for similar offenses under that state's law) and inter jurisdictional (where the
Court compares the defendant's sentence to sentences given for similar offenses in another state). Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2038 (Roberts,
C.J., concurring).
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131

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.

132

Id.

133

Id. (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2642 (2008) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the death penalty for
the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in the death of the victim); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U. S. 782, 797 (1982) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibited imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who aided and
abetted a felony in the course of which a murder was committed by others, but who the defendant did not himself kill, attempt to
kill, or intend that a killing would take place or that lethal force would be employed); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 585 (1977)
(holding that the death penalty was an excessive penalty for a rapist, who while deserving serious punishment, did not unjustifiably
take human life)).

134

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608-09 (2005).

135

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, passim (2002).

136

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572).

137

Id. (quoting Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650).

138

Id. (“The second classification of cases has used categorical rules to define Eighth Amendment standards. The previous cases in this
classification involved the death penalty.”).

139

Id. at 2022-23 (emphasis added).

140

Id. at 2023.

141

Id. at 2026.

142

Id. at 2035.

143

Id. at 2023.

144

Id. (citing Paolo G. Annino et al., Juvenile Life without Parole for Non-Homicide Offenses: Florida Compared to Nation 2 (2009)).

145

Id. at 2024. The numbers reflected current juvenile convicts at the time of the opinion, to the best of the Court's available data. Id.
Per the study used by the Court, the ten other states are “California, Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia--and in the federal system.” Id.

146

Id. at 2024.

147

See id. at 2026.

148

Id. at 2027.

149

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

150

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). The line has been drawn between homicide and serious non-homicide
offenses, wherein the former category encompasses a moral depravity that outweighs non-homicide offenses in terms of severity and
irrevocability. See id. at 2031 “Serious nonhomicide crimes ‘may be devastating in their harm ... but ‘in terms of moral depravity
and of the injury to the person and to the public,’ ... they cannot be compared to murder in their ‘severity and irrevocability.”’ Id.
at 2027 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2660 (2008)). Moreover, the life of a victim of a serious non-homicide
offense is not over, as it is for the victim of a murder. Id. Therefore, “when compared to an adult murderer, [the] juvenile offender
who [has] not kill[ed] or intend[ed] to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability. The age of the offender and the nature of the
crime each bear on the analysis.” Id. at 2026.
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151

Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573); see also Christopher Slobogin et al., A Prevention Model of Juvenile Justice: The Promise of
Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 185, 198 (1999) ( “[A]dolescents are more likely than adults to be influenced
by others, both in terms of how they evaluate their own behavior and in the sense of conforming to what peers are doing.”).

152

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70).

153

Id. at 2026-27 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).

154

Id. at 2026 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).

155

Id.; see also Marrus & Rosenberg, supra note 61, at 1180 (“If the child's brain is still growing until either twenty or twenty-five ...
subjecting a child to adult punishment, especially life without possibility of parole, is irrational. We do not know who that child will
be in five years or ten years. Just as teenagers' bodies change as they mature, so do their brains.”).

156

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569) (internal citations omitted); see Human Rights Watch, supra note 4, at 36
(discussing cognitive or psychosocial differences between juveniles and adults, and suggesting that “children simply think differently
than adults” and that “children lack social and emotional capabilities that are better developed in adults.”).

157

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. The Court commented that a juvenile offender under this sentence would serve more time than an adult
under the same sentence--for example, a sixteen-year-old and a seventy-five-year-old each sentenced to life without parole “receive
the same punishment in name only.” Id.; see also De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 4, at 983 (“LWOP is the harshest of sentences
that may be imposed on an adult. Imposing such a punishment on a child contradicts our modern understanding that children have
enormous potential for growth and maturity as they move from youth to adulthood, and the widely held belief in the possibility of
a child's rehabilitation and redemption.”).

158

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027.

159

Id. at 2027 (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)).

160

See id. at 2022.

161

Graham Transcript, supra note 1, at 11 (Counselor Gowdy for Petitioner).

162

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.

163

Human Rights Watch, supra note 4, at 20 (“Life without parole is imposed for a variety of crimes .... However, it is most often
imposed on child offenders who have been convicted of crimes of homicide ....”).

164

Graham Transcript, supra note 1, at 41 (Ginsburg, J.). Justice Ginsburg asked Petitioner Graham:
[H]ow do you answer the argument that unlike an adult, because of the immaturity, you can't really judge a person--judge a teenager
at the point of sentencing? That it's only after a period of time has gone by, and you see: Has this person overcome those youthful
disabilities? That's why a proportionality review on the spot doesn't accommodate the--what is the driving force of the--your--the
Petitioner's argument is you can't make a judgment until years later to see how that person has -has done.
Id.

165

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (emphasis added).

166

Id. at 2027.

167

Id. (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)).

168

While the Court is bound to decide the case before it and not issue advisory opinions, the Graham analysis uses a framework that
has meaning beyond life without parole sentences, leaving room for its applicability to term of years sentences. Compare Graham,
130 S. Ct. at 2017-18 (limiting the analysis to life without parole: “[t]he issue before the Court is whether the Constitution permits
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a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a nonhomicide crime.”), with id. at 2022 (acknowledging that
“[t]he present case involves an issue the Court has not considered previously: a categorical challenge to a term-of years sentence.”).

169

Id. at 2028; see also De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 4, at 1008 (“Indeed, the LWOP sentence penalizes child offenders more
than adults, because the child, by virtue of his or her young age, will likely serve a longer sentence than an adult given LWOP for
the same crime.”).

170

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting).

171

Id.

172

De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 4, at 983.
This growth potential counters the instinct to sentence youthful offenders to long terms of incarceration in order to ensure public
safety. Whatever the appropriateness of parole eligibility for [forty]-year-old career criminals serving several life sentences, quite
different issues are raised for [fourteen]-year-olds, certainly as compared to [forty]-year-olds, [who] are almost certain to undergo
dramatic personality changes as they mature from adolescence to middle age.
Experts have documented that children cannot be expected to have achieved the same level of psychological and neurological
development as an adult, even when they become teenagers. They lack the same capacity as an adult to use reasoned judgment, to
prevent inappropriate or harmful action generated as a result of high emotion and fear, and to understand the long-term consequences
of rash actions.
Id. at 983-84 (internal citations omitted).

173

Marrus & Rosenberg, supra note 61, at 1180.

174

See Human Rights Watch, supra note 4, at 3-4; see also Feld, supra note 22, at 13 (arguing for “a ‘youth discount”’ in sentencing
“to formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor.”).

175

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.

176

Id. at 2040 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-71 (2005)).

177

Id.

178

Id.

179

Id.

180

Id. (internal citation omitted).

181

Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).

182

Id. at 2054.

183

Id. at 2055.

184

Id. at 2032.

185

Feld, supra note 22, at 67 (noting that “[e]ven states that do not formally impose LWOP sentences on juveniles allow judges to
accomplish the functional equivalent and create ‘virtual lifers.”’). For example, a California appellate court overturned a fifteen-yearolds invalid LWOP sentence and resentenced him to two consecutive life sentences. Id.

186

See Nellis & King, supra note 24, at 36; see generally infra notes 194-97, 226-39 and accompanying text (discussing the sentences
of Sandra Davis Lawrence and Sarah Kruzan).

187

De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 4, at 984.
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188

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (explaining that the penalty of life without parole “forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal. By
denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person's value and
place in society. This judgment is not appropriate in light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender's capacity for change and limited moral
culpability.”).

189

Human Rights Watch, supra note 4, at 44, 47.

190

Id. at 47.

191

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

192

Id.

193

Id.

194

Tolo Olorunda, Sarah Kruzan: 16-Year-Old Sentenced to Life for Killing Pimp, The Daily Voice (Oct. 26, 2009), http://
thedailyvoice.com/voice/2009/10/sarah-kruzan-16yearold-sentenc-002362.php [hereinafter Sarah Kruzan]. On September 24, 2010,
Sarah Kruzan filed an Application for Clemency with the Office of the Governor in California. See Application for Clemency of Sarah
Kruzan, (Sept. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Kruzan Clemency Application] (on file with author), available at http:// www.youthlaw.org/
fileadmin/ncyl/youthlaw/litigation/Kruzan/sara-kruzan-clemency-applic-9-24-2010.pdf; see also Sara Kruzan, Serving Life Without
Parole, Petitions CA Governor for Release, News Blaze (Sept. 29, 2010), http:// newsblaze.com/story/20100929185820zzzz.nb/
topstory.html.

195

There is a discrepancy in Sarah Kruzan's age in the cited documents. Compare Sarah Kruzan, supra note 194, which provides a quote
that Ms. Kruzan is 29, with Kruzan Clemency Application, supra note 194, which lists her birthday as January 1, 1978, and that she
was 32 at the time of filing her clemency application on September 24, 2010.

196

Id.

197

Kruzan Clemency Application, supra note 194, at 2, 5 (emphasis added).

198

Graham Transcript, supra note 1, at 54 (Roberts, C.J.). Mr. Gowdy was counsel for Petitioner Graham. Id. at 1.

199

Id. at 26 (Counselor Makar for the State of Florida).

200

Id.

201

Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010) (“This clear line is necessary to prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences will
be imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment.”).

202

Id.

203

Graham Transcript, supra note 1, at 6 (Alito, J.).

204

Id. (referencing a Colorado statute that permits parole consideration after forty years).

205

Id. at 6-7 (Counselor Gowdy for Petitioner).

206

Id. at 7 (emphasis added).

207

Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010); see also id. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority provided no guidance
as to what meaningful opportunity entails or when it must occur).

208

Id. at 2030.

209

Id.
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210

Id. at 2032.

211

Id.

212

Id. at 2032-33.

213

See id. at 2033.

214

Id.

215

Id.

216

Id. at 2031, 2034.

217

Id. at 2034.

218

Id.; see supra notes 190 and accompanying text.

219

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.

220

“This clear line is necessary to prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile nonhomicide
offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment.” Id. at 2030.

221

Id. “Some juvenile justice advocates and scholars argued that by ordering states merely to provide an ‘opportunity’ for release,
the opinion did not go far enough in protecting young offenders from disproportionately punitive sentences.” Tamar R. Birckhead,
Graham v. Florida: Justice Kennedy's Vision of Childhood and the Role of Judges, 6 Duke J. of Const. L. & Pub. Pol'y Special
Issue 66, 75 n.64 (draft) (forthcoming 2010) (citing Jeffrey Fagan, Juvenile Justice Delayed? Rather than Set a Uniform Standard to
Reduce Harsh Sentences for Minors, the Court in Graham Left Compliance Mechanisms up tothe States, 32 Nat'l L.J. 38 (June 14,
2010) (“Rather than establishing a firm principle of discounted culpability that would cabin harsh sentencing for all minors, Graham
instead offers eligible juveniles a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’
The ‘means and mechanisms for compliance’ are left up to the states.”) (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2016)), available at http://
www.law.duke.edu/journals/djclpp/?action=downloadarticle&id=182.

222

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (commenting that the majority's holding will necessarily require Eighth
Amendment principles to govern review by parole boards that the “Court now demands that States empanel”).

223

See 59 Am. Jur. 2d Pardon and Parole § 85 (West 2010) (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,
442 U.S. 1, 19 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“Nothing in the Constitution requires a State to provide for probation or parole.”)).

224

Since 2000, various sources put the number of total states having abolished parole at either fifteen or sixteen, with either four or
five having abolished parole for certain violent offenders. See Press Release, Office of Justice Programs, Forty-two Percent of State
Parole Discharges Were Successful (Oct. 3, 2001), http://www.ojp.gov/archives/pressreleases/2001/bjs01181.html (“By the end of
last year 15 states had abolished parole board authority for releasing all offenders, and an additional 5 states had abolished parole
board authority for releasing certain violent offenders.”). Parole was abolished for federal convicts in 1987. See Local Role of the
U.S. Parole Commission: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Fed. Workforce, Postal Serv., and the D.C. Comm. on Oversight and
Gov't Reform., 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of Isaac Fulwood, Chairman, United States Parole Comm'n, http:// www.justice.gov/
ola/testimony/111-1/2009-09-22-uspc-fulwood-local-role.pdf.)

225

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028-29.

226

Nellis & King, supra note 24, at 35.

227

Id.

228

See id.
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229

Id. at 35-36.

230

See id. at 35; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. Detailed discussion of these incarceration justifications is beyond the scope of this Article.
In short, 1) retribution supports society's right to express its condemnation of the crime, and its desire to restore a moral imbalance
for the harm committed to the victim caused by offense; 2) deterrence suggests that a potential offender take the possible punishment
into consideration when making decisions; 3) incapacitation, while an important goal for purposes of decreasing recidivism, requires
the sentencer to make a judgment that the offender is incorrigible; and, finally 4) rehabilitation is the right to reenter the community.
Id. at 2028-29. The Graham Court discussed these penological goals in depth, but ultimately rejected the goals as viable justifications
for supporting life without parole for the juvenile nonhomicide offender. See id. at 2030. “In sum, penological theory is not adequate
to justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. This determination; the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide
offenders; and, the severity of life without parole sentences all lead to the conclusion that the sentencing practice under consideration
is cruel and unusual.” Id.

231

The California Coalition for Women Prisoners, Sandra Lawrence Ruling Important Victory / Shaputis Ruling a Setback, The Fire
Inside, 38 Summer/Fall 2008, at 12, http://www.womenprisoners.org/fire/FI38.pdf [hereinafter Sandra Lawrence].

232

Id.

233

See id.

234

See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.

235

Id.

236

Id.

237

Id.

238

Id.

239

Id.

240

Nellis & King, supra note 24, at 35.

241

Id. at 31 (“Some children serving life sentences have committed heinous and gruesome acts; it is a murder conviction that typically
prompts the sentence of life or life without parole for juveniles. For especially violent acts, long-term incarceration can be the most
appropriate option for them as well as for public safety goals. However, a parole hearing, offered at regularly scheduled intervals,
would provide the appropriate venue at which to determine which individuals should remain incarcerated and which have been
sufficiently reformed and demonstrate the maturity to warrant release.”) (emphasis added).

242

Id. at 41.

243

See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.

244

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:967B(4)(a) (West 2008). Prior to a 2001 amendment, the penalty for this provision was “life imprisonment
at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence and may be fined not more than five hundred thousand
dollars.” Id. (quoting language of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:967B(4)(a) prior to 2001 amendment, by Acts 2001, No. 403, § 4).

245

See Jan Moller, Parole would be made easier to obtain under bills headed to House floor, The Times-Picayune, http:// www.nola.com/
politics/index.ssf/2010/04/parole_would_be_made_easier_to.html [hereinafter Louisiana Parole Bills]. As of June 2010, HB 195,
which would change the number of votes required to grant parole to certain offenders under specified conditions was signed
by the Governor. See The Web Portal to the Louisiana State Legislature [hereinafter Louisiana State Legislature], at http://
www.legis.state.la.us/ (accessible under heading “Final Disposition of All Bills,” then click “House Bills,” then click on “195”),
or at http:// www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/byinst.asp? sessionid=10rs&billtype=HB&billno=195. House Bill 194, which would have
“[a]mend[ed] the earning rate for diminution of sentence and length of sentence which must be served before being eligible for parole”
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was not approved by the Senate. See Louisiana State Legislature, supra note 245, at http:// www.legis.state.la.us/ (accessible under
heading “Final Disposition of All Bills,” then click “House Bills,” then click on “194”), or at http:// www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/
byinst.asp? sessionid=10rs&billtype=HB&billno =194. Finally, HB 35, which would provide parole consideration for “certain elderly
inmates” is subject to call in the Louisiana Senate, meaning it may receive further action or consideration at a later date. See Louisiana
State Legislature, supra note 245, at http:// www.legis.state.la.us/ (accessible under heading “Final Disposition of All Bills,” then click
“House Bills,” then click on “35”), or at http:// www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/byinst.asp?sessionid=10rs&billtype=HB&billno=35;
and see http://www.legis.state.la.us/glossary.htm (defining “subject to call” for purposes of Louisiana State Legislature).

246

Louisiana Parole Bills, supra note 245, at 1 (H. B. 195). For an update on the status of HB 195, see supra note 245.

247

See id. (H. B. 194). For an update on the status of HB 194, see supra note 245.

248

See id. (H. B. 194). For an update on the status of HB 194, see supra note 245.

249

See id. (H. B. 35). For an update on the status of HB 35, see supra note 245.

250

See id. (“[A]pproved legislation ... would grant parole hearings to felons who are at least 60 years old ....”)

251

See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010) (“What the State must do, however, is give defendants like Graham some
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”).

252

For example, Justice Thomas, in his dissent, criticized the majority's categorical approach, inferring it was unnecessary given the
constitutional and governmental safeguards in place to ensure that any defendant receives a fair process and appropriate punishment.
Specifically, he stated:
In adopting these categorical proportionality rules, the Court intrudes upon areas that the Constitution reserves to other (state and
federal) organs of government. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from inflicting a cruel and unusual method of
punishment upon a defendant. Other constitutional provisions ensure the defendant's right to fair process before any punishment is
imposed. But, as members of today's majority note, ‘[s]ociety changes,’ and the Eighth Amendment leaves the unavoidably moral
question of who ‘deserves' a particular nonprohibited method of punishment to the judgment of the legislatures that authorize the
penalty, the prosecutors who seek it, and the judges and juries that impose it under circumstances they deem appropriate.
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2045 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also noted that the citizens of any state are in a better position
to determine what punishment they find tolerable. See id. at 2051 (inferring that the existence of a legislatively authorized penalty
means “at a minimum, that the citizens of that jurisdiction find tolerable the possibility that a jury of their peers could impose a lifewithout-parole sentence on a juvenile whose nonhomicide crime is sufficiently depraved.”), and id. at 2055 (“The integrity of our
criminal justice system depends on the ability of citizens to stand between the defendant and an outraged public and dispassionately
determine his guilt and the proper amount of punishment based on the evidence presented.”). See also Birckhead, supra note 221,
at 76-78 (discussing that Justice Thomas' dissent in Graham, along with Justice Scalia's dissent in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005), oppose the view that Graham did not go far enough to protect young offenders from disproportionately punitive sentences,
premised on a “traditional reading of American history” and the contention that the Graham and Roper majorities “flagrantly imposed
their ‘own sense of morality and retributive justice’ on state lawmakers and voters.”).

253

See supra notes171-72 and accompanying text.

254

The United States Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally
released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)
(deciding to grant parole release requires “the [parole] Board to assess whether, in light of the nature of the crime, the inmate's release
will minimize the gravity of the offense, weaken the deterrent impact on others, and undermine respect for the administration of
justice.”). Id. at 8. See also US Department of Justice, US Parole Commission, Answering Your Questions, http:// www.justice.gov/
uspc/questions.htm (“The law says that the U.S. Parole Commission may grant parole if (a) the inmate has substantially observed
the rules of the institution; (b) release would not depreciate the seriousness of the offense or promote disrespect for the law; and (c)
release would not jeopardize the public welfare.”). States have no duty to establish parole systems. See supra note 223. But, as an
example of a state parole process for adults, in California, only inmates who are sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of
parole are subject to “suitability hearings” by the parole board, and become automatically eligible, one year prior to their minimum
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eligible parole date. California Dep't of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Adult Parole Operations, Lifer Parole Process,
http:// www.cdcr.ca.gov/Parole/Life_Parole_Process/Index.html. Of significance,
Being scheduled for a parole hearing is no indication of the inmate's suitability for release from prison. Whether inmates are found
suitable for parole is a judgment of the BPH [Board of Parole Hearings] hearing panel. These inmates are sentenced to the possibility
of parole, not the assurance of it, recognizing that their maximum potential sentence is life. It is not uncommon for inmates to receive
many parole hearings before they are found suitable for release.
Id. A California parole board considers the following factors to determine whether an inmate is suitable for release: “counseling
reports and psychological evaluations, behavior in prison (i.e., disciplinary notices or laudatory accomplishments), vocational and
educational accomplishments in prison, involvement in self-help therapy programs that can range from anti-addiction programs for
drugs and alcohol to anger management, [and] parole plans, including where an inmate would live and support himself if he was
released.” Id. Further, relying on the California Supreme Court's decision in In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061(2005), overruled
in part on other grounds by, Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), parole boards are entitled to consider
public safety, and such a concern “trumps any expectancy the indeterminate life inmate may have in a term of comparative equality
with those served by other similar offenders.” Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1084. For additional factors affecting the grant or denial of
parole, see 59 Am. Jur. 2d Pardon and Parole §§ 86-91 (discussing factors such as prison conduct, likelihood of rehabilitation, merit
to society, deterrence, seriousness of offense effect of restitution, and prior criminal record).

255

The only reference in Graham to parole boards comes from Justice Thomas's dissent, where he questions the majority's requisite
for states to provide some meaningful opportunity for release. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas states, “But what, exactly, does such a ‘meaningful’ opportunity entail? When must it occur? And what Eighth Amendment
principles will govern review by the parole boards the Court now demands that States empanel? The Court provides no answers to
these questions, which will no doubt embroil the courts for years.” Id. (emphasis added).

256

See id. at 2030 (“Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of
incarceration for the duration of their lives. The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of
nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for life.”).

257

Id. at 2030.

258

See id. at 2026. For international examples of rehabilitation for juveniles, see De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 4, at 983 (engaging in
comparative analysis of juvenile justice and rehabilitation models in other countries and the United States for purposes of identifying
alternative to harsh and inappropriate sentences for children).

259

See NCJJ, supra note 23 (select a state in the “State Profiles” drop down menu, then at “Select a Topic” choose “Aftercare/Re-entry.”)
(last visited July 20, 2010).

260

See generally id.

261

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Reentry Resource Launched, Rentry.gov, http://www.reentry.gov/.
According to the National Center for Juvenile Justice, as of 2006, participating jurisdictions include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. For example, in Colorado all juveniles released from incarceration must have a period
of mandatory service and supervision by the juvenile parole officers to aid in their transition back into the community. NCJJ, supra
note 23, at Aftercare/Re-entry. In Connecticut, the Department of Children and Families places a strong emphasis on community
reintegration and requires the juvenile to participate in pre-release transition activities to allow for a structured return to the community
upon their release. Id. at Connecticut, Aftercare/Re-entry. In Alaska, the Division of Juvenile Justice uses the Youth Level of Service/
Case Management Inventory as a measure of assessment during aftercare. Id. at Alaska, Aftercare/Re-entry. And in 2006 Georgia
created JUSTGeorgia--a partnership with the State's justice and social service systems, designed to pass a new juvenile code reflecting
best practices for child development and preventing detention by fostering healthy behaviors outside the juvenile justice system. Id.
at Georgia, Entire Profile.
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262

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

263

Id. at 2021.

264

See id. (reiterating that the Eighth Amendment standard of extreme cruelty “is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies
a moral judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society change.”)
(quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 12 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008)).

265

See id. at 2031-32.

266

Id. at 2033.

267

Id.

268

See Ashby Jones, Is Florida Ignoring a High Court Ruling on Juvenile Sentences?, The Wall Street Journal, Law Blog, at 1 (Nov.
23, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/11/23/is-florida-ignoring-a-high-court-ruling-on-juvenile-sentences/ (commenting that in
Florida, “more than six months after the U.S. Supreme Court [ruling] ... not a single former juvenile sentenced in such cases has
found much relief[,] [i]nstead, ... Florida courts, in several high-profile cases are re-sentencing the juveniles to new terms that still
amount to life sentences.”).

269

Marrus & Rosenberg, supra note 61, at 1183.

270

See Human Rights Watch, supra note 4, at 36.

271

Id.

272

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (internal citations omitted). For further information on the culpability of juveniles as compared to adults,
see Human Rights Watch, supra note 4, at 36 (discussing cognitive or psychosocial differences between juvenile and adults, and
suggesting that “children simply think differently than adults” and that “children lack social and emotional capabilities that are better
developed in adults.”).

273

Human Rights Watch, supra note 4, at 22-23. For more information on the case of Stacey Torrance, see Matt Stroud, Little Kid, Life
Sentence, Philadelphia City Paper, July 29, 2009, http:// citypaper.net/articles/2009/07/30/little-kid-life-sentence.

274

Human Rights Watch, supra note 4, at 23 (emphasis added) (quoting Letter from Stacey Torrance to Human Rights Watch (May 20,
2004) (on file with Human Rights Watch)).

275

Id. at 41.
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